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  11. Introduction 
  Game theorists and economists have been intrigued by "Hide-and-Seek" games for more 
than 50 years (von Neumann (1953)). Rubinstein and Tversky (1993; henceforth "RT") and 
Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller (1996; "RTH") were perhaps the first to study such games 
experimentally; see also Rubinstein (1999; "R"). RT, RTH, and R (collectively "RTH" from now 
on) elicited subjects' initial responses to several closely related Hide-and-Seek games. In a leading 
example of their games, one player, the Hider, hides a "treasure" or "prize" in one of four locations; 
and the other player, the Seeker, looks in one of the locations. Because the Seeker looks without 
observing the Hider's choice, their choices are strategically simultaneous. If the Seeker chooses the 
same location as the Hider he wins a given amount; if not, the Hider wins that amount. 
  Instead of giving subjects a payoff matrix, RTH explained the Hide-and-Seek games in 
"stories," probably increasing comprehension. Their key innovation was to present the games with 
non-neutral framing of the locations. R, for example, told Seekers: "You and another student are 
playing the following game: Your opponent has hidden a prize in one of four boxes arranged in a 
row. The boxes are marked as follows: A, B, A, A. Your goal is, of course, to find the prize. His 
goal is that you will not find it. You are allowed to open only one box. Which box are you going to 
open?" Hiders were told an analogous story. In effect the entire structure, including the order and 
labeling of locations, was publicly announced, with the goal of making it common knowledge. 
  This story makes the framing of locations non-neutral in two ways. The "B" location is 
uniquely distinguished by its label, and is thus focal in one of Schelling's (1960) senses. And the 
two "end A" locations, though not distinguished by their labels, may be inherently focal, as RT and 
RTH argue, citing Christenfeld (1995).
2 As RTH note, these two focalities interact to give the 
remaining location, "central A," its own brand of uniqueness as "the least salient location" (RT). 
  RTH's design is important as a tractable abstract model of applications in which games like 
Hide-and-Seek are played on naturally occurring, non-neutral, cultural or geographic "landscapes." 
Equilibrium analysis ignores such landscapes unless they directly influence the payoff structure. 
Consider, for instance, the complete-information Hide-and-Seek game derived from the above 
example, presented as a payoff matrix in Figure 1 with each player's winning payoff normalized to 
                                                 
2See also R's discussion of Ayton and Falk's (1995) two-dimensional Hide-and-Seek experiment.   
  21.
3 This game has a unique equilibrium, in which both players randomize uniformly, treating the B, 
central A, and end A locations symmetrically.
4 Because the Seeker can look in only one of the four 
locations, the Hider has an advantage, with equilibrium expected payoff ¾ versus ¼ for the Seeker. 
Hider/Seeker A  B  A  A 
A  0, 1  1, 0  1, 0  1, 0 
B  1, 0  0, 1  1, 0  1, 0 
A  1, 0  1, 0  0, 1  1, 0 
A  1, 0  1, 0  1, 0  0, 1 
Figure 1. Hide-and-Seek Game 
  Despite these clear equilibrium predictions, the publicly announced order and labeling of 
locations create a potential for framing effects, and RTH's subjects deviated systematically from 
equilibrium in ways that were highly sensitive to framing.
5 Table I gives the aggregate choice 
frequencies for the "RTH-4" treatment described above and RTH's most closely related treatments. 
In RTH-4 the "least salient" central A location is the modal choice for both Hiders and Seekers, and 
is even more prevalent for Seekers than Hiders. As a result, the frequency with which Seekers find 
the prize exceeds ¼ and Seekers have higher expected payoffs than in equilibrium. These patterns 
extend, properly interpreted, to the other five treatments in the top half of Table I, which we argue 
in Section 2 are closely analogous to RTH-4. They also extend, with minor exceptions, to a large 
sample from more recent web experiments (Ariel Rubinstein, private communication); and with 
variations explained below to the less closely analogous treatments in the bottom half of Table I.    
These systematic deviations from equilibrium are particularly intriguing because they are 
asymmetric across player roles, while equilibrium yields symmetric predictions. RT and RTH took 
them as prima facie evidence that their subjects did not think strategically, and with one exception 
noted in Section 2, they did not consider alternative explanations. In RT's words, "The finding that 
both choosers and guessers selected the least salient alternative suggests little or no strategic 
                                                 
3RT's and RTH's subjects' payments appeared sufficient to motivate them, and the binary-lottery structure of the payoff 
function implies under standard assumptions that players maximize expected money payoffs, without regard to risk 
preferences. Note however that in R's experiments, subjects were not paid or screened for exposure to game theory. 
4Von Neumann (1953) characterized equilibria for such games allowing payoffs to vary across locations; and for a two-
dimensional game in which the Hider hides in a matrix and the Seeker tries to guess either the Hider's Row or Column.  
5Although in this game any strategy, pure or mixed, is a best response to equilibrium beliefs, systematic deviations of 
aggregate choice frequencies from equilibrium probabilities are symptomatic of deviations from equilibrium beliefs. 
Other studies of framing effects in games include Scharlemann et al. (2001), who studied trust games in which 
otherwise anonymous players were "labeled" by photographs; and Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994), who studied 
coordination games in which decisions had naturally occurring labels as in Schelling's (1960) classic experiments.   
  3thinking." In RTH's words, "In the competitive games, however, the players employed a naïve 
strategy (avoiding the endpoints), that is not guided by valid strategic reasoning. In particular, the 
hiders in this experiment either did not expect that the seekers too, will tend to avoid the endpoints, 
or else did not appreciate the strategic consequences of this expectation." 
Table I. Aggregate Choice Frequencies in RTH's Experiments 
RTH-4  A  B  A A 
Hider  (53)  9% 36% 40%  15% 
Seeker (62)  13%  31%  45%  11% 
RT-AABA-Treasure A  A  B  A 
Hider (189)  22%  35%  19%  25% 
Seeker (85)  13%  51%  21%  15% 
RT-AABA-Mine A  A  B  A 
Hider (132)  24%  39%  18%  18% 
Seeker (73)  29%  36%  14%  22% 
RT-1234-Treasure 1  2  3 4 
Hider (187)  25%  22%  36%  18% 
Seeker (84)  20%  18%  48%  14% 
RT-1234-Mine 1  2  3 4 
Hider (133)  18%  20%  44%  17% 
Seeker (72)  19%  25%  36%  19% 
R-ABAA A  B  A A 
Hider (50)  16%  18%  44%  22% 
Seeker (64)  16%  19%  54%  11% 
RTH-1  Triangle  Circle Circle  Circle 
Hider (53)  23%  23%  43%  11% 
Seeker (62)  29%  24%  42%  5% 
RTH-2 Polite  Rude  Honest Friendly 
Hider (53)  15%  26%  51%  8% 
Seeker  (62)  8% 40% 40%  11% 
RTH-3  Smile  Smile Smile  Frown 
Hider (53)  21%  26%  34%  19% 
Seeker  (62)  7% 25% 34%  34% 
RTH-5 Frown  Smile  Frown Frown 
Hider (53)  15%  40%  34%  11% 
Seeker (62)  16%  55%  21%  8% 
RTH-6 Hate  Detest  Love  Dislike 
Hider (53)  11%  23%  38%  28% 
Seeker (62)  20%  21%  55%  14% 
Sample sizes in parentheses; focal labels in italics; order of presentation of locations to subjects as shown.  
  4In our view, however, such robust patterns are unlikely to lack a coherent explanation; and 
given the simplicity of the strategic questions Hide-and-Seek games pose, the explanation is 
unlikely to be nonstrategic. On the contrary, such systematic deviations from equilibrium in games 
where its rationale is especially strong seem a particularly promising "proving ground" for 
alternative, non-equilibrium theories of strategic behavior. Understanding RTH's results is likely to 
prove helpful in many applications involving games like Hide-and-Seek played on non-neutral 
landscapes, where people's choices are sensitive to the landscape but equilibrium ignores it.     
This paper compares alternative explanations of RTH's results and conducts an illustrative 
econometric analysis that helps to discriminate among them. We focus on explaining the patterns of 
deviation from equilibrium that are common to RTH-4 and, mutatis mutandis, the five most closely 
analogous RTH treatments in the top half of Table I: the prevalence of central A (or its analog, as 
explained in Section 2) for both Hiders and Seekers, its greater prevalence for Seekers (or their 
analogs), and the fact that Seekers (or their analogs) find the treasure more often than in 
equilibrium. We seek a parsimonious explanation that rests on behaviorally plausible assumptions. 
Section 2 explains the other treatments in Table I and the senses in which they are 
analogous to RTH-4, and reports tests for differences in choice frequencies across treatments. 
Section 3 considers what may be the simplest way to try to explain RTH's results: an 
equilibrium analysis of the Hide-and-Seek game with payoff perturbations that reflect "hard-wired" 
preferences about the salient focally labeled and/or end locations. This model can explain the 
prevalence of central A for both Hiders and Seekers by postulating behaviorally plausible 
perturbations of equal magnitudes but opposite signs across player roles, with Hiders averse to 
focally labeled and/or end locations and Seekers favoring them (Figure 2). But the model can only 
explain the greater prevalence of central A for Seekers by allowing large, unexplained differences 
across roles in the perturbations' magnitudes as well as their signs. Such differences give the model 
enough flexibility to explain almost any pattern, raising concerns about overfitting. 
Section 4 considers explanations based on a generalization of equilibrium called Quantal 
Response Equilibrium ("QRE"; McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)), which explains the patterns of 
deviations from equilibrium in some other experiments. In a QRE players' choices are noisy, with 
the probability of each choice increasing in its expected payoff, given the distribution of others' 
choices; a QRE is thus a fixed point in the space of players' choice distributions. The specification 
is completed by a response distribution, whose noisiness is represented (inversely) by a precision 
  5parameter. Some of our results are independent of this distribution, but for others we adopt the 
standard assumption of logit responses and study the special case called "logit QRE". 
Hide-and-Seek without payoff perturbations has enough symmetry to make QRE coincide 
with equilibrium for any error distribution, but perturbations that are sensitive to framing give QRE 
the potential to explain RTH's results. Logit QRE can explain the prevalence of central A for 
Hiders and Seekers with perturbations of equal magnitudes but opposite signs across player roles, 
as in Section 3's perturbed equilibrium model. However, the main difficulty is explaining the 
greater prevalence of central A for Seekers, and logit QRE with perturbations of equal magnitudes 
but opposite signs robustly predicts that central A is more prevalent for Hiders.
6 Like equilibrium, 
logit QRE can only explain RTH's results by postulating large differences across roles in the 
perturbations' magnitudes as well as their signs. With or without such differences, however, the 
maximum likelihood estimate of the precision parameter is effectively infinite, reducing the logit 
QRE model to the analogous equilibrium with perturbations model from Section 3.
7
These analyses show that equilibrium or QRE with payoff perturbations can only explain 
RTH's results by postulating essentially unrestricted differences in players' payoffs across roles. 
Besides creating a risk of overfitting, such differences beg the question of why the Hide-and-Seek 
game elicits responses that are systematically asymmetric across player roles. Accordingly, Section 
5 returns to Hide-and-Seek without payoff perturbations and considers explanations based on a 
structural non-equilibrium model that explains the patterns of deviation from equilibrium in some 
other experiments that elicit initial responses to games (Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995); Nagel 
(1995); Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998); Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001); Camerer, 
Ho, and Chong (2004); and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004)). This model allows individual 
behavior to be heterogeneous, with each player following one of a hierarchy of "level-k" or "Lk" 
                                                 
6Rosenthal, Shachat, and Walker (2003) find that QRE does explain the qualitative features of subjects' systematic, 
role-asymmetric deviations from equilibrium in some 2x2 Hide-and-Seek games with varying money payoffs. 
However, their results were driven by payoff differences, and unrelated to framing. See also McKelvey, Palfrey, and 
Weber (2000), who find that QRE does less well in explaining behavior in other kinds of zero-sum games. 
7More precisely: Without differences in magnitudes, the estimated λ→∞. With such differences, for any sufficiently 
large λ but finite QRE can adjust the perturbations to match the observed frequencies exactly. Thus λ and the 
perturbations are not identified, but all parameter values that maximize the likelihood are equivalent to those obtained 
when λ→ ∞. With finite lambda the estimated perturbations for Hiders (Seekers) are higher (lower) than those 
estimated for equilibrium with perturbations. 
  6decision rules or types; but it assumes that each player's type is drawn from the same distribution, 
thus eliminating unexplained differences in behavioral assumptions across player roles.
8  
Our level-k model has five types, L0, L1, L2, L3, and L4. Type Lk for k > 0 anchors its 
beliefs in a naïve L0 type, described below, and then adjusts them via thought-experiments 
involving iterated best responses: L1 normally best responds to L0, L2 to L1, and so on.
9 Each type 
Lk for k > 0 also makes uniform errors, with a probability independent of k and player role. 
Lk types have accurate models of the game and are rational; they depart from equilibrium 
only in basing their beliefs on simplified models of other players. This yields a workable model of 
others' choices while avoiding the cognitive complexity of equilibrium analysis. In Selten's (1998) 
words: "Basic concepts in game theory are often circular in the sense that they are based on 
definitions by implicit properties…. Boundedly…rational strategic reasoning seems to avoid 
circular concepts. It directly results in a procedure by which a problem solution is found. Each step 
of the procedure is simple, even if many case distinctions by simple criteria may have to be made." 
Because Lk for k > 0 ignores the framing except as it affects the anchoring type L0, L0 is the 
key to the model's potential to explain RTH's results. L0 plays multiple roles, as L1's model of 
others, L2's model of others' models of itself, and so on. We take L0 to be nonstrategic, as is usual 
in such analyses; but we allow L0 Hiders and Seekers to favor the salient focally labeled and/or end 
locations, to an equal extent in each player role. We also represent L0's preferences directly as 
choice probabilities rather than payoff perturbations.
10 Our assumption that L0's probabilities are 
non-uniform departs from much of the literature, but there is ample precedent for adapting L0 to the 
setting, and in RTH's games a uniform L0 would make Lk the same as equilibrium for all k.
11  
Under these assumptions the level-k model can explain RTH's results for plausible values of 
L0's choice probabilities and the population type frequencies, with no asymmetry across player 
                                                 
8Symmetry in behavioral assumptions across roles is natural here because the types are general decision rules, meant to 
explain differences in Hiders' and Seekers' behavior, and the roles were filled by subjects from the same pool. 
9Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004) provide experimental support for our assumptions that L2 best responds to an L1 
without decision errors, and to L1 alone rather than a mixture of L1 and L0, etc., unlike in Stahl and Wilson (1995) or 
Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004). Our model with five types is the most general model of this kind, because in the 
unperturbed Hide-and-Seek game our types' choices cycle, so that L5 is equivalent to L1, L6 to L2, and so on (Table II).  
10This difference from our equilibrium model is less important than it may seem because it does not affect the range of 
possible best responses for Lk for k > 0; and L0's choices could be "purified" via privately observed perturbations. 
11See for example Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt's (1998) analysis of guessing games; or Crawford's (2003) analysis of 
strategic deception via cheap talk, where the Sender's and Receiver's L0 types are based on truthfulness or credulity, as 
in the informal literature on deception. By contrast, the level-k model's other basic component, the adjustment of Lk 
beliefs for k > 0 via iterated best responses, appears to yield a satisfactory account of initial responses in many settings. 
  7roles in behavioral assumptions. Given L0's attraction to focally labeled and/or end locations, L1 
Hiders choose central A to avoid L0 Seekers and L1 Seekers avoid central A in their searches for 
L0 Hiders. For similar but more complex reasons, L2 Hiders choose central A with probability 
between zero and one and L2 Seekers choose it with probability one; L3 Hiders avoid central A and 
L3 Seekers choose it with probability between zero and one; and L4 Hiders and Seekers both avoid 
central A (Table II). For our estimated type frequencies, which are similar to—but imply somewhat 
more sophistication than—those that have been estimated for other settings (see Costa-Gomes and 
Crawford (2004) and the papers discussed there), these choice patterns allow the level-k model to 
explain the prevalence of central A for both Hiders and Seekers, its greater prevalence for Seekers 
than Hiders, and the fact that Seekers find a Treasure more often than in equilibrium.
12
  To put this explanation into perspective, compare it with a simpler alternative that has been 
suggested to us: "Hiders feel safer avoiding focal locations, so they are most likely to choose 
central A; and Seekers know this, so they are also most likely to choose central A." This sounds 
plausible, but it has two weaknesses: It implicitly assumes that Hiders are systematically less 
sophisticated (L1, in our terminology) than Seekers (L2), and it does not explain the greater 
prevalence of central A for Seekers.
13 Our level-k model remedies both weaknesses by using a 
behaviorally plausible specification of L0 and the type frequencies, the same for Hiders and 
Seekers, to explain all three of the robust patterns RTH observed, including the role asymmetries. 
  Section 5's analysis shows that the level-k model is a promising alternative to equilibrium or 
QRE with payoff perturbations explanations of RTH's results, but all three models' predictions 
depend on behavioral parameters that must be estimated or translated from other settings. Section 6 
compares the models more systematically, focusing on the equilibrium and level-k models because 
when estimated the QRE model effectively reduces to the equilibrium model. We first estimate the 
equilibrium and level-k models econometrically, pooling the data from the six treatments on which 
                                                 
12Note that the level-k model's explanation goes against its specification of L0, which avoids central A in either role. 
Our level-k analysis is similar in some respects to Bacharach and Stahl's (2000) "level-k variable-frame" analysis of 
coordination and Bacharach and Stahl's (1997a) analysis of Hide-and-Seek games (not in the published version, 
Bacharach and Stahl (2000); and Bacharach and Stahl (1997b), whose title suggests a more detailed version of their 
Hide-and-Seek analysis, is unavailable). However, our analysis makes much simpler behavioral assumptions, in that 
only L0 responds directly to the framing, and our players need not reason about each other's knowledge of L0.  
13Note that levels of sophistication are meaningfully comparable across roles. The quotation in the text could be 
inverted to "Seekers are drawn to focal locations, so they are unlikely to choose central A; Hiders know this, so they are 
likely to choose central A." This version uses the same logic as the one in the text, with player roles interchanged; but it 
does not fit the patterns in RTH's data, suggesting that an explanation requires empirical knowledge in addition to logic.  
  8our analysis focuses. We then address concerns about overfitting by using estimates computed 
separately, treatment by treatment, to "predict" the results of the other five treatments. 
  In the equilibrium with payoff perturbations model, the restriction of equal magnitudes 
across player roles is strongly rejected. With unrestricted perturbations, the equilibrium model has a 
small likelihood advantage over the level-k model, because role-dependent perturbations give it 
more freedom to fit the observed frequencies. But our favored specification of the level-k model 
has a modest advantage over the equilibrium model in prediction, with 18% lower mean squared 
error and better predictions in 20 of 30 comparisons. 
  Overall, our results make a good case for using the level-k model to explain RTH's results. 
It explains the role asymmetries in RTH's data without assuming differences in behavior across 
roles, while the equilibrium and QRE can only explain them via large, unexplained differences in 
the signs and magnitudes of Hiders' and Seekers' payoff perturbations. It dispenses with the strong 
coordination of beliefs assumption that underlies equilibrium and QRE, which is strained for initial 
responses to a game with subtle differences in payoffs. Finally, it rests on general decision rules 
and behavioral parameters that, except for L0's choice probabilities, characterize strategic behavior 
in a way that is portable and stable across games. All these factors give reason for confidence that 
the level-k model explains RTH's results, rather than just describing them.
14
Section 7 is the conclusion. 
2. Cross-Treatment Analogies and Preliminary Tests 
  This section describes RTH's other treatments in Table I and explains the senses in which 
they are analogous to the RTH-4 treatment discussed in the Introduction. We argue that the patterns 
of deviations from equilibrium observed in RTH-4—the prevalence of central A for both Hiders 
and Seekers, its greater prevalence for Seekers, and the fact that Seekers find the prize more often 
than in equilibrium—extend, properly interpreted, to the five RTH treatments that are most closely 
analogous to RTH-4 (Table I, top half). We also report preliminary statistical tests of whether the 
choice frequencies in those six treatments can be pooled in the econometric analysis. 
  In RTH-4 the Hider hid a desirable "prize," which we call a "treasure" as in RTH (1996). 
The five other treatments in the top half of Table I include three more "Treasure" treatments, RT-
AABA-Treasure (with the B in the third position, perhaps because it was run in Hebrew), RT-1234-
  9Treasure, and R-ABAA. They also include two "Mine" treatments, RT-AABA-Mine and RT-1234-
Mine, identical to the corresponding Treasure treatments except that the hidden object is 
undesirable, so that Hiders' and Seekers' payoffs are interchanged. This yields an equivalent normal 
form with players' roles reversed, leaving equilibrium predictions otherwise unchanged. However, 
because Hiders inherently move first, even though Seekers do not observe their choices Mine 
treatments have different extensive forms than Treasure treatments with roles reversed. RTH, 
suspecting that this difference might make it easier for Seekers to mentally simulate Hiders' 
choices, used Mine treatments to test whether it explains the role-asymmetric patterns in their data; 
but the Mine treatments yielded results very close to the corresponding Treasure treatments with 
roles reversed.
15 This suggests that the role-asymmetries were somehow driven by subjects' 
responses to the normal-form structure, as in all of the theoretical explanations considered here. 
In the three ABAA or AABA Treasure treatments and the AABA Mine treatment, central 
A—RT's "least salient" location—was the modal choice for both Hiders and Seekers. This pattern 
extends to the 1234 Treasure and Mine treatments if we follow RT's suggestion that "the least 
salient response…may correspond to 3, or perhaps 2" and take 2 as analogous to B and 3 to central 
A. Given this identification, central A was more prevalent for Seekers in all four Treasure 
treatments and more prevalent for Hiders in both Mine treatments; thus this pattern is also the same 
in all six treatments if Hiders in Treasure and Seekers in Mine treatments are identified. Further, the 
frequencies with which Seekers found a Treasure or a Mine exceeded ¼, so that Seekers (Hiders) 
had higher (lower) expected payoffs than in equilibrium in Treasure treatments, and vice versa in 
Mine treatments. Accordingly, our analysis "builds in" these analogies by identifying 2 with B, and 
Mine treatments with the corresponding Treasure treatments with reversed player roles. To avoid 
unnecessary repetition, we use "central A" ("B") to refer to either a central A (B) or a 3 (2) location; 
and we refer to Mine treatments as if they were Treasure treatments with reversed roles. 
  After transforming the data as suggested by these identifications, chi-square tests for 
aggregate differences in subjects' choice frequencies across the six treatments in the top half of 
Table I reveal no significant difference for Seekers (p-value 0.2297) and a marginally significant 
difference for Hiders (p-value 0.0417). Pairwise tests show that this last difference can be attributed 
to RTH-4, which differed from the other treatments in having unusually high frequencies of B (as 
                                                                                                                                                                   
14Although equilibrium is also a general decision rule, it is less clear how to translate the payoff perturbations needed to 
explain RTH's results to new games, and we are unaware of any estimates of them to which ours can be compared. 
15Weber, Camerer, and Knez (2004) found weak effects of timing without observability in other games.  
  10well as central A) for both Hiders and Seekers. Nonetheless, in keeping with our goal of explaining 
the prevalence of central A for both Hiders and Seekers, and its greater prevalence for Seekers, 
both of which hold in RTH-4 as well as the other five treatments, we pool all six treatments for the 
econometric analysis and remark how the results differ for RTH-4. The pooled sample includes 624 
Hiders and 560 Seekers, with aggregate choice frequencies as shown in Table III.
16
  Although our analysis focuses on the six treatments in the top half of Table I, the five 
treatments in the bottom half are worth some discussion because they provide additional evidence 
of the robustness of the patterns RTH observed. These treatments are all Treasure treatments with 
the same payoff structure as RTH-4, but with labels with positive or negative connotations and/or 
focally labeled end locations.
17 RTH-2 and RTH-5 are analogous to RTH-4 except for the 
connotations of the focal label. RTH-1 and RTH-3 are analogous to RTH-4 except that the focal 
label is at an end position, and in RTH-3 it has a negative connotation. RTH-6 is analogous to 
RTH-5 except that the focal label is in the third rather than second position; and is analogous to 
RTH-2 and RTH-4 except for this difference in position and that the focal label has a positive 
connotation in RTH-6 but negative or neutral connotations in RTH-2 or RTH-4. The choice 
frequencies for these imperfectly analogous RTH treatments echo those for the ones we analyze, 
with complicating shifts in expected directions. It seems likely that Section 5's level-k explanation 
of RTH's results could be adapted to these treatments by estimating new L0 choice probabilities. 
3. Equilibrium with Payoff Perturbations 
This section considers explanations of RTH's results via equilibrium analysis of a perturbed 
game, whose players' payoffs are influenced by the salience of focally labeled and/or end locations 
as well as their strategic consequences. We take these payoff perturbations to reflect hard-wired 
preferences, independent of strategic reasoning. Following RTH's discussions of typical responses 
to salience, we assume that Seekers receive an additional, psychic payoff of e for choosing an end 
location (equal for both ends for simplicity) or f for choosing the focally labeled B location, and 
that Hiders lose payoffs of equal magnitudes for such choices (Figure 2). We start by taking e and f 
to have the same magnitudes for both player roles, and focus on the leading case where e, f > 0.
18
                                                 
16Minor corrections to the published data were needed to reconcile the reported frequencies and sample sizes.  
17These subjects played a series of games with the same normal form but different labelings. They were anonymously 
and randomly paired, without feedback, to induce them to treat each of the games as "one-shot." 
18In Section 5 we report estimates of e = 0.2187 and f = 0.2010 without this restriction, confirming that e, f > 0 provides 
the best explanation of RTH's results for the equilibrium with restricted perturbations model. 
  11If –1 < f – 2e, 2e – 3f, 2e + f < 3, the perturbed game has a unique, symmetric, totally mixed 
equilibrium. In this equilibrium Hiders and Seekers both play A, B, A, A with probabilities ¼ – e/2 
+ f/4, ¼ + e/2 – 3f/4, ¼ + e/2 + f/4, and ¼ – e/2 + f/4 respectively. A Hider's expected payoff is ¾ – 
e/2 – f/4 and a Seeker's is ¼ + e/2 + f/4. Thus, both Hiders and Seekers play central A with 
probability ¼ + e/2 + f/4, which is greater than ¼ whenever 2e + f > 0 but equal for Hiders and 
Seekers if e and f are. A Seeker finds the treasure with probability: 
(1)
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which is greater than ¼ for any e, f > 0, so equilibrium with payoff perturbations can explain why 
Seekers find the treasure more often than in a standard equilibrium. Equilibrium with perturbations 
of equal magnitudes but opposite signs across player roles can thus explain all the patterns RTH 
observed except the greater prevalence of central A for Seekers. The model can explain this only by 
assuming e and f have different magnitudes across roles, with 2e + f sufficiently larger for Hiders 
than Seekers.
19 Such differences give the model enough flexibility to explain almost any pattern. 
Hider/Seeker  A B A A 
A  0 – e, 1 + e 1  –  e , 0 + f   1 – e , 0  1 – e , 0 + e  
B  1 – f, 0 + e   0 – f , 1 + f   1 – f , 0  1 – f , 0 + e  
A  1, 0 + e   1, 0 + f   0, 1  1, 0 + e  
A  1 – e , 0 + e   1 – e , 0 + f   1 – e , 0  0 – e , 1 + e  
Figure 2. Hide-and-Seek Game with Payoff Perturbations 
 
4. Quantal Response Equilibrium with Payoff Perturbations 
Because QRE, defined informally in the Introduction, responds only to the payoff structure, 
it ignores the framing of the Hide-and-Seek game without payoff perturbations (Figure 1). In that 
game, for any error distribution, there is a unique QRE, which yields the same choice probabilities 
as equilibrium. To see this, fix a distribution, and suppose to the contrary that in a QRE the most 
probable location for Hiders, call it L, has probability greater than ¼. Because QRE choice 
probabilities increase with expected payoffs and the game is constant-sum, L must then have the 
  12highest expected payoff for Seekers, and so has probability greater than ¼ for them. But then some 
location other than L has higher expected payoff for Hiders, contradicting the initial hypothesis. 
This section accordingly considers explanations that combine logit QRE with payoff 
perturbations as in Figure 2, which make QRE sensitive to framing and give it the potential to 
explain RTH's results. As is almost always the case, such models must be solved computationally. 
Figure 3 illustrates logit QRE with payoff perturbations restricted to be equal in magnitude 
but opposite in sign across player roles, as a function of λ, with e = 0.2187 and f = 0.2010, the 
values that best fit RTH's data for Section 2's equilibrium with restricted perturbations model 
(Section 6). The maximum likelihood estimate of λ in the QRE with restricted perturbations model 
is infinite, reducing the model to the equilibrium with restricted perturbations model (footnote 7). 
As in Figure 3, for all combinations of e, f = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, or 0.4 (all consistent with a totally mixed 
equilibrium), the logit QRE probability of central A dips below 0.25 for low values of λ for Seekers 
but never for Hiders; and it is always higher for Hiders, reversing the patterns in RTH's data.
20
Like equilibrium with payoff perturbations, logit QRE can only explain RTH's results by 
allowing the magnitudes of the perturbations e and f to differ across roles. This yields an effectively 
infinite estimate of λ, reducing logit QRE, in terms of its substantive implications, to Section 2's 
equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations model (footnote 7). Figure 4 illustrates logit QRE with 
eH = 0.2910, fH = 0.2535, and eS = fS = 0.1539, the values that give the best fit for the equilibrium 
with unrestricted perturbations model. 
5. A Model with Boundedly Rational "Level-k" Types 
Returning to the Hide-and-Seek game without payoff perturbations (Figure 1), we now 
consider a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses with boundedly rational level-k 
types as discussed in the Introduction. Each player follows one of five types, L0, L1, L2, L3, or L4, 
with given probabilities r, s, t, u, and v respectively, the same for each player role. Type L0 Hiders 
and Seekers both choose A, B, A, A with probabilities p/2, q, 1– p – q, p/2 respectively, taking the 
probabilities of the end locations to be equal for simplicity. We focus on the leading case in which 
p > ½ and q > ¼, reflecting L0's nonstrategic attraction to salient locations. We also assume that for 
k > 0, an Lk Hider or Seeker normally chooses type k's location for his role, defined by iterating 
                                                                                                                                                                   
192e+f must be larger for Hiders because larger values are associated with higher probabilities of central A, and Hiders' 
value determines Seekers' probability. In Section 5 we report estimates of eH = 0.2910, fH = 0.2535, and eS = fS = 0.1539 
for the equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations model: all positive as expected, and nearly twice as large for Hiders. 
20There is enough structure to suggest that this result is symptomatic of a theorem, but we have been unable to prove it. 
  13best responses to L0, with ties broken randomly with equal probabilities.
21 But with probability ε, 
equal across roles and values of k > 0, he makes an error, in which case he chooses each location 
with probability ¼; these errors are independently and identically distributed across players. This 
implies that a location can be chosen with probability greater than ¼ in the population of Hiders or 
Seekers only if it is a best response for some type that has positive probability in the population. 
 
Figure 3. QRE with Payoff Perturbations of Equal Magnitudes Across Player Roles 
 
Figure 4. QRE with Payoff Perturbations of Differing Magnitudes Across Player Roles 
                                                 
21As noted in the Introduction, L0 plays multiple roles in this model, as L1's model of others, L2's model of others' 
model of itself, etc. This is a plausible simplification if the intuitions L0 reflects are widely understood. It is less 
strained than the knowledge assumptions of equilibrium with payoff perturbations because it refers only to L0, which 
reflects more basic intuitions; and because here there is no need for the knowledge about L0 to be mutual or common.     
  14Table II lists L0's, L1's, L2's, L3's, and L4's normal choice probabilities when p + 2q > 1 and 
3p + 2q > 2, distinguishing the regions p < 2q and p > 2q.
 22 These inequalities hold when L0 favors 
both B and end locations, so that p > ½ and q > ¼, and also for some other values of p and q. It is 
easy to show that L5's choice probabilities (though not its expected payoffs) are the same as L1's, so 
that the types cycle after L4 (footnote 9). The bottom lines of Table II give the population's total 
choice probabilities for the entire population in this case, including errors. Figure 5 summarizes the 
types' normal choices for the other cases, where it is not assumed that p > ½ and q > ¼. 
For central A to be prevalent for both Hiders and Seekers, its total probability for Hiders,  
(2)     r(1-p-q)+(1-ε)[s+(t/2 if p > 2q) + (t/3 if p < 2q)]+(1-r)ε/4 > ¼. 
This means that a weighted average of the population frequencies of L1 and L2 (with weights 
depending on whether p > 2q, and on ε) is sufficiently greater than the frequency of L0 to outweigh 
L0 Hiders' tendency to avoid central A. For central A to be more prevalent for Seekers than Hiders, 
(3)       t + u > 2s if p > 2q or 2t + u > 3s if p < 2q. 
This means that a weighted average of the population frequencies of L2 and L3 (with weights 
depending on whether p > 2q) is sufficiently greater than the frequency of L1 to outweigh L1 
Seekers' tendency to avoid central A. Inequalities (2) and (3) show that the level-k model can 
explain the prevalence of central A for both Hiders and Seekers and its greater prevalence for 
Seekers than Hiders for values of the population type frequencies similar to, but somewhat more 
sophisticated than, those estimated for other settings (see Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004) and 
the papers discussed there). It is noteworthy that RTH's results, when viewed through the lens of 
the non-equilibrium level-k model via (2) and (3), imply lower bounds on the population's 
sophistication, in contrast to RTH's interpretation of the results as evidence of strategic naivete. 
6. Econometric Analysis 
The models considered here all make predictions that depend on behavioral parameters: 
payoff perturbations for equilibrium and QRE, a precision parameter for QRE, and L0's choice 
probabilities and the population type frequencies for the level-k model. This section makes our 
                                                 
22Given our error structure, there are linear dependencies among types' choice probabilities for Hiders and Seekers; but 
they are different for Hiders and Seekers, so the population type frequencies are still identified from the full sample. 
  15Table II. Types' Expected Payoffs and Choice Probabilities when p + 2q > 1 and 3p + 2q >2
Hider Exp. Payoff    Choice  Pr. Exp. Payoff Choice Pr. Seeker Exp. Choice  Pr. Exp. Payoff Choice Pr.
  p < 2q  p < 2q  p > 2q p > 2q p < 2q p < 2q p > 2q p > 2q
L0 (Pr. r)     L0 (Pr. r)  
A    - p/2 - p/2 A -  p/2 - p/2
B    - q  - q B-  q - q
A    - 1-p-q -1 - p-q A-  1 - p-q -1 - p-q
A    - p/2 - p/2 A -  p/2 - p/2
L1 (Pr. s)     L1 (Pr. s)  
A 1  –  p/2 < ¾  0  1 – p/2 < ¾ 0 A p/2 > ¼ 0 p/2 > ¼ ½
B 1  –  q < ¾  0  1 – q < ¾ 0 B q > ¼ 1 q > ¼ 0
A  p + q > ¾  1  p + q > ¾ 1 A 1–p–q < ¼ 0 1–p–q < ¼ 0
A 1  –  p/2 < ¾  0  1 – p/2 < ¾ 0 A p/2 > ¼ 0 p/2 > ¼ ½
L2 (Pr. t)     L2 (Pr. t)  
A        1 1/3 ½ 0 A 0 0 0 0
B        0 0 1 ½ B 0 0 0 0
A        1 1/3 1 ½ A 1 1 1 1
A        1 1/3 ½ 0 A 0 0 0 0
L3 (Pr. u)     L3 (Pr. u)  
A        1 1/3 1 1/3 A 1/3 1/3 0 0
B        1 1/3 1 1/3 B 0 0 ½ ½
A        0 0 0 0 A 1/3 1/3 ½ ½
A        1 1/3 1 1/3 A 1/3 1/3 0 0
L4 (Pr. v)     L4 (Pr. v)  
A        2/3 0 1 ½ A 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
B        1 1 ½ 0 B 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
A        2/3 0 ½ 0 A 0 0 0 0
A        2/3 0 1 ½ A 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
Total Probability  p < 2q  p >2 q Total Probability  p < 2q p >2 q
A  rp/2+(1-ε)[t/3+u/3]+(1-r)ε/4  rp/2+(1-ε)[u/3+v/2]+(1-r)ε/4 A rp/2+(1-ε)[u/3+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4 rp/2+(1-ε)[s/2+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4 
B  rq+(1-ε)[u/3+v]+(1-r)ε/4  rq+(1-ε)[t/2+u/3]+(1-r)ε/4 B rq+(1-ε)[s+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4 rq+(1-ε)[u/2+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4
A  r(1-p-q)+(1-ε)[s+t/3]+(1-r)ε/4  r(1-p-q)+(1-ε)[s+t/2]+(1-r)ε/4 A r(1-p-q)+(1-ε)[t+u/3]+(1-r)ε/4 r(1-p-q)+(1-ε)[t+u/2]+(1-r)ε/4 
A  rp/2+(1-ε)[t/3+u/3]+(1-r)ε/4  rp/2+(1-ε)[u/3+v/2]+(1-r)ε/4 A rp/2+(1-ε)[u/3+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4 rp/2+(1-ε)[s/2+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4 
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Figure 5. L1's Through L4's Choices as Functions of L0's Choice Probabilities 
 
analyses more concrete by using RTH's data to estimate those parameters econometrically. We 
focus on the equilibrium and level-k models because the estimated QRE model reduces to 
equilibrium. We then address the issue of overfitting by using estimates computed for each model, 
treatment by treatment, to "predict" the results of the other five treatments. 
Our purpose is to illustrate the possibilities of the level-k and equilibrium with perturbations 
models, not to take a definitive position on the behavioral parameters, which in our view would 
require more comprehensive experiments, perhaps with a design that tracks individual subjects' 
choices across different but related games as in Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995); Costa-Gomes, 
Crawford, and Broseta (2001); or Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004). Because both models have 









L1 H: B 
L1 S: central A 
L2 H: B & end As 
3p +2q = 2 
Region 6 
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L1 H: B 
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L1 H: central A 
L1 S: end As 
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L2 S: central A  p = 2q  Region 5  L3 H: B & end As 
L1 H: end As  L3 S: B & central A 
L1 S: central A  L4 H: end As 
L2 H: B & end As  L4 S:  B & end As 
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  17little more than a calibration exercise. But using econometrics to calibrate the models constrains 
our discretion, and yields likelihoods that provide an objective criterion by which to compare them. 
Our econometric model is a mixture-of-types model as in Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) or 
Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001), with one type for the equilibrium with perturbations 
model and five for the level-k model (Sections 2 and 4). Let Xij denote the total numbers of Hiders 
or Seekers (as i = H, S) who choose location j (with A, B, A, A denoted 1, 2, 3, 4). If pijk is the 
probability that a Hider or Seeker of type k chooses location j, the likelihood can be written: 
(4)         . ] [
,4 , 3 , 2 , 1 ∏ ∏ ∏
==
≡
S H ij k
X
ijk
ij p L  
The pijk for the equilibrium model are ¼ – e/2 + f/4, ¼ + e/2 – 3 f/4, ¼ + e/2 + f/4, and ¼ – 
e/2 + f/4 for locations A, B, A, A ≡ 1, 2, 3, 4, for i = H, S (Section 3). Because the equilibrium that 
best describes RTH's results will be totally mixed, here we dispense with an error structure. 
The pijk for the level-k model can be read from Figure 5 (where multiple listed locations for 
Hiders or Seekers in a region have equal choice probabilities) or, when p > ½ and q > ¼, Table 2. 
Here we specify the error structure as simply as possible (uniform) to avoid specification bias. 
Table III summarizes parameter estimates and likelihoods for the equilibrium with payoff 
perturbations and level-k models, the former with and without the restriction that the perturbations 
are equal in magnitude for Hiders and Seekers, and the latter estimated under the constraints p > ½ 
and q > ¼, which ensure that L0 favors focally labeled or end locations.
23 The table also gives the 
models' predicted choice frequencies, with RTH's observed frequencies for comparison. 
For the equilibrium model, we strongly reject the restrictions that eH = eS and fH = fS (p-value 
0.0022). Accordingly, we focus on the equilibrium model with unrestricted perturbations. Both it 
and the level-k model have enough flexibility to fit the observed choice frequencies very well, 
except that both restrict the two end locations to have equal probabilities, which is not quite true in 
the data. The unrestricted equilibrium model has a small likelihood advantage, because role- 
dependent perturbations give it slightly more freedom to fit RTH's observed choice frequencies.
24 
                                                 
23These constraints are binding. Estimating the model without them yields estimates in Region 5 (Figure 5), with p < ½, 
q < ¼, 2q > p, and a fit nearly identical to that of equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations. We focus on the estimates 
in the text because p < ½, q < ¼ is implausible for a nonstrategic L0, and such estimates allow the level-k model to 
overfit, creating the same "prediction" problems we identify below for equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations.          
24To put this difference in perspective, the maximum possible log-likelihood, associated with perfect prediction of the 
choice frequencies, is –1561.7 (strictly negative here because the model makes probabilistic predictions). 
  18We are unaware of any estimates with which to compare its estimated payoff perturbations, but 
their signs are behaviorally plausible; however, their magnitudes are nearly twice as large for 
Hiders than Seekers, a difference for which it seems hard to find a sensible explanation. 
  Table III. Parameter Estimates and Likelihoods for the Leading Models 
Model Ln  L  Parameter  Estimates  Actual and Predicted Choice 
Frequencies for Hiders and Seekers 
        A B A A 
Observed choice     H  0.2163    0.2115  0.3654  0.2067 
frequencies     S  0.1821    0.2054  0.4589  0.1536 
Equilibrium without  -1641.4   H  0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 
perturbations/random     S  0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 
Equilibrium with 
perturbations of equal  -1568.5  eH = eS = 0.2187  H  0.1897    0.2085  0.4122   0.1897 
magnitudes 
across player roles 
 
  fH = fS = 0.2010  S  0.1897    0.2085  0.4122  0.1897 
Equilibrium with 
perturbations of  -1562.4  eH = 0.2910, fH = 0.2535  H  0.2115    0.2115  0.3654   0.2115 
unrestricted magnitudes 
across player roles     eS = 0.1539, fS = 0.1539  S  0.1679    0.2054   0.4590   0.1679 
Level-k with   -1564.4  H  0.2052    0.2408   0.3488   0.2052 
p > ½, q > ¼, and p > 2q   
r = 0, s = 0.1896,  t =0.3185, 
u=0.2446, v = 0.2473, ε = 0  S  0.1772    0.2047  0.4408  0.1772 
 
The level-k model's estimates are generally behaviorally plausible, with r = 0, so that L0 
exists only in the minds of L1 through L4; and ε = 0, so there are no choices unexplained by L1 
through L4.
25 Because the estimated r = 0, L0's choice probabilities p and q are not identified; but 
the region in which the likelihood is maximized subject to p > ½ and q > ¼ is identified as Region 
2 (Figure 5), where p > 2q so L0 favors end more than focally labeled locations.
26 The estimated 
                                                 
25The finding that there are no L0 subjects is consistent with the common finding that people systematically 
underestimate others' sophistication relative to their own (see for instance Weizsäcker (2003)). In Hide-and-Seek 
without payoff perturbations, our uniform errors are perfectly confounded with the equilibrium mixed-strategy 
probabilities. Thus our finding that ε = 0 also suggests the absence of an Equilibrium type. Further, we can reject 
explanations in which a not-too-large part of the population choose locations with given probabilities (like L0) and the 
rest play equilibrium in a game among themselves, taking the first part's behavior into account, like the Sophisticated 
type in Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001), Crawford (2003), or Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004). 
26The maximized log-likelihood in Region 1 is slightly lower, at -1567.9. In a sense the "best fit" is on the border 
between Regions 1 and 2, where p = 2q, which yields log-likelihood -1563.8; but here the parameters are not identified 
  19type frequencies are close to previous estimates, but somewhat more sophisticated than usual (Stahl 
and Wilson (1994); Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001); Costa-Gomes and Crawford 
(2004); Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004)).
27 This could be due either to more sophisticated subject 
pools, or to the simplicity and transparency of the strategic questions Hide-and-Seek poses. 
Given the flexibility of the equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations and level-k models' 
parameterizations, overfitting is a concern. We test for it by re-estimating the models separately for 
each of the six treatments and using each re-estimated model to "predict" the observed choice 
frequencies of the other five treatments. For the level-k model we restrict the estimates to Region 2 
(p > 2q) because the parameters are not identified in Region 1 (p < 2q) without imposing r = ε = 0; 
and while the fit is slightly better in Region 1 for RTH-4 (log-likelihood -143.0 versus -144.2 in 
Region 2), RT-AABA-Treasure (-361.1 versus -363.6), and R-ABAA (-142.0 versus -142.1), 
Region 2 yields more sensible parameter estimates and better predictions. We evaluate goodness-
of-fit by the mean squared deviation ("MSD") between predicted and observed choice frequencies. 
Tables IV-VII summarize the results of the overfitting test. Although the equilibrium with 
unrestricted perturbations model has a fit at least as good in each treatment (Table VII's diagonal), 
our favored specification of the level-k model has a modest advantage in prediction, with mean 
squared prediction error 18% lower and better predictions in 20 of 30 comparisons (Table VII).
28
7. Conclusion 
This paper has compared alternative explanations of the systematic patterns of deviation 
from equilibrium observed in RTH's experiments with two-person constant-sum Hide-and-Seek 
games with unique mixed-strategy equilibria and non-neutral framing of locations. We focus on 
two models, equilibrium with unrestricted payoff perturbations and a structural non-equilibrium 
model of initial responses based on boundedly rational "level-k" types. A third model, logit QRE 
with payoff perturbations, reduces when estimated to the equilibrium with perturbations model. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
(in RTH's dataset) even if we restrict r = ε = 0. The parameters are identified if we restrict r = s = v = 0, allowing ε > 0, 
which yields the model with role-dependent L0 of the June 2004 preliminary draft of this paper. Due to these 
identification problems and the theoretical advantages of role-independent L0, we focus here on the interiors of regions. 
27When the estimates are computed separately for RTH-4 (the treatment for which we found a marginally significant 
difference) and the other five treatments pooled, we find that RTH-4's likelihood (subject to p > ½ and q > ¼) slightly 
favors Region 1 (p < 2q) over Region 2 (log-likelihood -143.0 versus -144.2), with very different type frequencies; 
while the pooled treatments' likelihood slightly favors Region 2 (log-likelihood -1415.0 versus -1417.8).   
28However, if we allow Region 1 estimates for RTH-4, RT-AABA-Treasure, and R-ABAA and assume r=ε=0 to avoid 
identification problems, the level-k and equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations models have the same overall MSD. 
  20Table IV. Treatment by Treatment Parameter Estimates 
Treatment  Level-k  Equilibrium with Perturbations 
  r s  t  u  v ε e H fH eS fS
RTH-4  0 0.2499 0.2643 0.4858 0.0000 0 0.3307  0.1451 0.2736 0.0377
RT-AABA-Treasure  0 0.1577 0.3265 0.3226 0.1932 0 0.3648 0.2941  0.1164 0.1640
RT-AABA-Mine  0 0.1566 0.3393 0.0686 0.4355 0 0.1818 0.2121  0.1028 0.2192
RT-1234-Treasure  0 0.1572 0.3810 0.1421 0.3197 0 0.3035  0.2976 0.1471 0.1390
RT-1234-Mine  0 0.2066 0.3153 0.2603 0.2178 0 0.2669  0.2406 0.1667 0.1111
R-ABAA  0 0.1933 0.3743  0.2683  0.1641 0 0.4141 0.3594 0.2500  0.2600 
 
 
Table V. Level-k MSDs Treatment by Treatment  







Mine  R-ABAA 
RTH-4  0.0020     0.0032  0.0098  0.0031  0.0019  0.0032 
RT-AABA-Treasure  0.0047 0.0014  0.0061  0.0016 0.0009 0.0039 
RT-AABA-Mine  0.0132 0.0042  0.0011  0.0029 0.0023 0.0085 
RT-1234-Treasure  0.0072 0.0016  0.0029  0.0007 0.0002 0.0037 
RT-1234-Mine  0.0054 0.0017  0.0035  0.0009 0.0000 0.0034 
R-ABAA  0.0040 0.0023  0.0073  0.0016 0.0010 0.0023 
 
 
Table VI. Equilibrium with Perturbations MSDs Treatment by Treatment  







Mine  R-ABAA 
RTH-4  0.0002 0.0088  0.0156  0.0079 0.0050 0.0087 
RT-AABA-Treasure  0.0089 0.0001  0.0039  0.0013 0.0017 0.0022 
RT-AABA-Mine  0.0153 0.0034  0.0005  0.0031 0.0032 0.0070 
RT-1234-Treasure  0.0076 0.0009  0.0031  0.0005 0.0004 0.0025 
RT-1234-Mine  0.0053 0.0018  0.0037  0.0009 0.0000 0.0036 
R-ABAA  0.0085 0.0019  0.0071  0.0027 0.0032 0.0004 
 
 
Table VII. Difference in MSDs (Equilibrium – Level-k) Treatment by Treatment  
Overall MSD 







Mine  R-ABAA 
RTH-4  -0.0018 0.0056  0.0058  0.0048 0.0031   0.0055 
RT-AABA-Treasure  0.0042 -0.0013  -0.0022 -0.0003 0.0009 -0.0017 
RT-AABA-Mine  0.0021 -0.0008  -0.0006  0.0001 0.0008   -0.0015 
RT-1234-Treasure  0.0003 -0.0007  0.0001  -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0012 
RT-1234-Mine  -0.0002 0.0001  0.0001  0.0001 -0.0000   0.0002 
R-ABAA  0.0045 -0.0004  -0.0001  0.0010 0.0023 -0.0020 
 
  21The predictions of the equilibrium with perturbations and level-k models both depend on 
behavioral parameters. When these are estimated econometrically, both models prove flexible 
enough to fit RTH's observed choice frequencies very well. Equilibrium with payoff perturbations 
has a small advantage in likelihood, but the level-k model has a modest advantage with regard to 
overfitting, with cross-treatment "predictions" with 18% lower mean squared errors on average. 
Overall, our results make a good case for using the level-k model to explain RTH's results. 
It explains the role asymmetries in RTH's data without assuming differences in behavior across 
roles, while equilibrium with payoff perturbations requires large, unexplained differences in the 
magnitudes of Hiders' and Seekers' perturbations. It dispenses with the strong coordination of 
beliefs assumption that underlies the equilibrium with perturbations model, which seems strained 
for initial responses to a game with subtle differences in payoffs. Finally, the level-k model rests on 
general decision rules and behavioral parameters that, with the exception that L0 may need to be 
tailored to each new game, can be used directly to predict behavior in other games, and it has a 
modest advantage in cross-treatment "predictions" in RTH's dataset. These considerations all 
suggest that the level-k model better identifies the structure of subjects' responses to RTH's Hide-
and-Seek games than the alternatives considered here. 
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